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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 07-3002
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
NELKIS GUTIERREZ-GAINZA,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 05-cr-432
District Judge: The Honorable Jan E. DuBois

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 3, 2008
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 9, 2008 )

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On June 26, 2007, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania sentenced Nelkis Gutierrez-Gainza to a term of imprisonment of twenty
years pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), which provides that any person convicted

of distributing five kilograms or more of cocaine “after a prior conviction for a felony
drug offense has become final . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which
may not be less than 20 years . . . .” Gutierrez-Gainza appeals his sentence, arguing that
the Government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a prior
felony drug conviction. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
A grand jury returned a superseding indictment on November 22, 2005, charging
Gutierrez-Gainza and a co-defendant with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(Count One), and distributing and aiding and abetting the distribution of five kilograms or
more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Two).
On October 13, 2006, the Government filed an Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851
alleging that a Minnesota state court had convicted Gutierrez-Gainza of aiding and
abetting possession of a controlled substance, a fifth-degree felony offense punishable by
imprisonment for up to five years. The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) indicated that
Gutierrez-Gainza had pleaded guilty to this offense on October 14, 2003 and received a
suspended sentence of 21 months of imprisonment. A jury found Gutierrez-Gainza guilty
of Counts One and Two on October 30, 2006. At the sentencing hearing, GutierrezGainza’s counsel argued that the Government had failed to meet its burden of proof to
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establish that the Minnesota conviction had not been overturned and that the man
convicted in Minnesota was the same person. The District Court rejected these
arguments. Relying on the Minnesota conviction, the District Court sentenced GutierrezGainza on July 26, 2007 to the mandatory minimum penalty of twenty years of
imprisonment prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) for defendants with a prior felony drug
conviction, along with a ten-year period of supervised release and monetary penalties.
Gutierrez-Gainza filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Government bears the burden of proving the fact of a prior conviction by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir.
2006). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings. See F ED. R.
E VID. 1101(d)(3). Instead, “the court may consider relevant information without regard
to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). We review a District Court’s factual findings related to sentencing
for clear error. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568–70 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
First, Gutierrez-Gainza argues that the Government failed to prove the fact of his
Minnesota conviction by a preponderance of the evidence because it did not introduce a
certified copy of the conviction. Instead, the Government introduced (1) a transcript of
the Minnesota plea and sentencing hearing; (2) a letter from the Probation Office of the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota regarding the prior conviction;
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(3) search results for Gutierrez-Gainza’s name from the Statewide Supervision System of
the Minnesota Department of Corrections that mention the conviction; (4) a copy of his
record in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database that mentions
the Minnesota conviction; (5) the Minnesota criminal complaint; and (6) the Minnesota
case history summary. Gutierrez-Gainza asserts that these documents were insufficient
because they would not necessarily indicate whether his conviction had been overturned.
In contrast, he asserts, the Clerk’s Office in Minnesota would review his file and confirm
that the conviction had not been overturned before providing a certified conviction.
Gutierrez-Gainza does not claim, however, that his conviction has been overturned but
rather that the Government did not satisfy its burden to show that it has not been
overturned.
In this case, in which the defendant has not even made a bare assertion that his
conviction was actually overturned, the documents that the Government introduced are
sufficient to establish a prior conviction for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). In United
States v. Watkins, we stated that a court may impose a sentencing enhancement under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), without requiring the
Government to produce a certified copy of the defendant’s prior convictions. 54 F.3d
163, 166–68 (3d Cir. 1995). We specifically noted that a sentencing court may rely on
facts in a PSR when the defendant does not challenge their accuracy. Id. at 166–67. A
similar approach is warranted for mandatory minimum sentences under
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§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). When a defendant offers no assertion that his conviction was
overturned, a sentencing court does not commit clear error by concluding that the
Government is not required to produce a certified copy of the conviction in order to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that a valid conviction exists.
Second, Gutierrez-Gainza argues that the Government did not prove that he is the
same person who was convicted in Minnesota. Again, his argument is based solely on the
Government’s burden of proof; he does not assert that the person convicted in Minnesota
actually was a different person. He argues that, in order for the Government to meet its
burden of proof, “[e]ither an arresting officer should identify the Appellant or an expert
should come in to court and compare fingerprints to verify” that his fingerprints match the
ones on file for the Minnesota conviction. Br. of Appellant 11. Because we believe that
the District Court has the discretion to determine when such measures are necessary to
verify a defendant’s identity, we decline to create a rule that they are required in every
case as part of the Government’s burden of proof. In the instant case, the District Court
made an undisputed finding that Gutierrez-Gainza’s name and date of birth matched those
of the man convicted in Minnesota, and Gutierrez-Gainza never asserted that the
conviction was not his. Given these facts, we hold that the District Court’s finding that
Gutierrez-Gainza had a prior Minnesota conviction was not clearly erroneous.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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